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A South African Variety of Capitalism?
NICOLI NATTRASS
This paper explores the South African political economy through the lens of a
variety of capitalism (VoC) approach. It argues that attempts were made in the
early post-apartheid period to forge a more social-democratic and co-ordinated
variety of capitalism, but that this floundered as the government adopted neolib-
eral macroeconomic policies against the wishes of organised labour, and as
black economic empowerment policies further undermined an already racially-
fraught business sector. Organised labour was able to push for, and maintain, pro-
tective labour market policies – but this came at the cost of growing policy incon-
sistency notably with regard to trade liberalisation which, in the presence of
growing labour-market protection, has exacerbated South Africa’s unemployment
crisis. Unemployment remains intractable (and with it inequality) and corruption/
patrimonialism appears to be a growing problem.
Keywords: post-apartheid, capitalism, economic policy, unemployment, black
economic empowerment, organised labour, profitability
Introduction
This paper argues that as South Africa began the transition to democracy, attempts
were made to forge a more social-democratic and co-ordinated form of capitalism
but that this floundered as the post-apartheid government adopted neoliberal
macroeconomic policies. Black economic empowerment (BEE) policies sub-
sequently undermined an already racially-fraught business sector and opened
the door for growing patrimonialism and corruption. Organised labour achieved
gains in terms of improved labour standards and the extension of industrial-
level wage bargaining – but this came at the cost of growing policy inconsistency.
Notably, trade liberalisation in the presence of strong labour-market protection
and rising real wages exacerbated South Africa’s unemployment crisis.
The problem of policy inconsistency is highlighted by the varieties of capital-
ism (VoC) approach, its key insight being that economic growth is shaped by the
institutional/policy context and promoted most effectively when these are consist-
ent with either liberal-market or co-ordinated ideal-type ‘varieties’ of capitalism.
We argue that South Africa has elements of both ideal types and is plagued by
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policy inconsistencies at the heart of the state. Although many of the ideas and
practices during South Africa’s democratic transition suggested the possibility
of a post-apartheid political economy shaped by social accords/tripartite nego-
tiation, this impetus floundered because the state preferred to act unilaterally
with regard to macroeconomic policy, business was divided and preferred bilateral
engagement with government and organised labour had a strong ideological pre-
ference for managing capitalism through a developmental state tasked with pro-
moting wage and productivity growth.
Varieties of capitalism: South Africa in comparative context
The VoC approach draws a key distinction between two ideal types: ‘liberal
market economies’ (LMEs) and ‘co-ordinated market economies’ (CMEs) (see
Hall and Soskice 2001; Hall and Gingerich 2009). In LMEs, seen as approximated
most closely by North America, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand,
firm strategies are mediated by competitive markets: large stock markets and regu-
latory regimes facilitate hostile take-overs, thus encouraging managers to be
particularly sensitive to current profitability; whilst fluid labour-markets with
limited employment protection incentivise workers to invest in general skills
that can be transported to other jobs. By contrast, firms in CMEs (seen as approxi-
mated most closely by Germany and the Scandinavian social democracies) operate
in an institutional environment which provides greater ‘voice’ for organised
labour and favours incremental innovation and strategic collaboration between
firms. Generous welfare and retraining policies on the part of government incen-
tivise workers to make the necessary investments in firm-specific skills. The key
insight of the firm-centred VoC approach is that business in CMEs accepts higher
labour costs (and taxation) so long as the system delivers the necessary skills, pro-
ductivity growth and long-term finance needed to operate profitably in this insti-
tutional and policy context. Where these synergies are not evident, as in the more
‘mixed market economies’ (MMEs), economic growth has been slower than in
either the CMEs or LMEs (Hall and Gingerich 2009).
The strong policy implication of VoC analysis is that institutions matter for the
type and pace of economic growth. As Hall and Soskice note, firms face a set of
institutions which are not ‘fully under their control’ and that companies can be
expected to gravitate towards strategies that take advantage of the opportunities
provided by these institutions (2001: 15). This raises the tantalising prospect of
government being able to affect the national VoC by changing the institutional
environment. For example, in the 1950s when Germany introduced legislation
to enhance worker’s rights on the shop floor, employers expressed strong opposi-
tion – but once these institutions were in place, they developed production strat-
egies oriented towards high-value added production which made a virtue out of the
necessity of greater worker voice (Streeck 1992). As discussed below, this idea,
that governments can create such a ‘win-win’ situation through institutional
design, is powerfully evident in South Africa today.
The VoC approach has been criticised for its tendency towards static and func-
tionalist analysis (see Boyer 2005; Schmidt 2009; Becker 2012). One way to avoid








































this danger is to highlight the political processes shaping the nature of institutional
configurations and co-ordination As Hall and Thelen observe:
active support for a specific mode of co-ordination must be mobi-
lised on a relatively continuous basis from actors who are con-
scious of the limitations as well as the advantages of any
particular course of action. Achieving and maintaining coordi-
nation usually involves the exercise of power, because forging
and maintaining particular institutional arrangements creates
winners and losers, notably on both sides of the class divide.
(2009: 13)
But politics is shaped not only by conflicts of interest and accordant mobilisation.
The way these interests are framed in ideas and discourse by economic and state
actors is of central importance, especially at critical junctures where policy-
makers and stake-holders are not sure how best to understand and pursue their
interests. In this regard, discursive institutionalism is useful in that it ‘calls atten-
tion to the ways in which political actors’ ideas serve to (re)conceptualize interests
and values as well as (re)shape institutions’ (Schmidt 2009: 530). These ideas are,
in turn, embedded in different discourses – notably ‘communicative discourse’
between the state and the general public, and ‘coordinative discourse’ within
the state between policy actors (Schmidt 2008: 309–11). We touch on these
issues below with reference to the South African policy debate in the post-
apartheid period.
The usefulness of the VoC approach has also been challenged by the substantial
institutional convergence – notably falling levels of wage bargaining – that has
taken place in Europe since the mid-1990s. However, in a recent review of collec-
tive bargaining arrangements, Hayter et al. observe, with the exception of
Germany, Spain and Greece, European wage bargaining systems are adapting
rather than weakening (2011: 235). Even where the dominant level of wage bar-
gaining has fallen in the CMEs, multi-level bargaining is the norm and this has
been consistent with fairly stable levels of coverage of collective bargained agree-
ments. In other words, bargains at industry- or firm-level often take place within a
floor or framework set at higher levels, or through national initiatives. This is evi-
denced in Table 1 by typically higher levels of wage co-ordination than suggested
by the dominant level of wage bargaining.
Table 1 shows the persistence of some of the economic and institutional charac-
teristics highlighted by VoC analysis in countries typically classified as LMEs or
CMEs: CMEs still have more generous labour-market policies (as proxied by the
cost of firing in terms of weeks of wages), greater trade union coverage, higher
levels of wage co-ordination and wage bargaining, lower inequality, a higher
share of government in the economy (as proxied by tax as per cent of GDP),
lower levels of stock market capitalisation, higher levels of product-market regu-
lation and a generally more complex regulatory environment in which government
and business organisations play a greater role than is the case in the LMEs. Like
the LME’s, South Africa has relatively high levels of market capitalisation and























































































Australia 34,259 1.23 136.1 24.2 5.6 61.7 10.9 1.9 2 0.7 4 18.9 15–50 2 (2) 1
Canada 34,567 0.96 137.2 12.8 8.3 61.7 32.6 1.3 1.0 0.6 0.4 28 27.3 31.6 1 (1) 0
New Zealand 25,413 1.27 52.9 6.1 64.1 2.5 1.6 0.2 0.4 20.6 ,15 2 (1) 1
UK 31,985 0.79 138.3 28.6 7.7 58.3 2.1 1.4 1 0.7 22 27.6 33.6 1 (1) 0
USA 41,735 0.84 117.5 10.3 9.3 59.3 40.8 1.8 1.8 0.7 1.4 11.9 13.7 1 (1) 0
CMEs
Austriaa 34,673 1.38 18.0 20.1 4.8 58.4 29.1 2.1 1.4 6.1 5.2 2 29.1 99 4 (2) 2
Denmark 32,027 0.99 74.7 35.0 6.0 67.3 2.1 1.4 0 0 19.1 62.5 3 (3) 1
Finlanda 30,722 1.12 49.5 21.3 8.2 61.1 26.9 2.1 1.4 1.1 1.1 26 67.5 90 3 (3) 1
Germanya 32,255 1.27 43.2 11.8 7.7 55.3 28.3 2.1 1.4 5.9 4.8 69 19.1 62.5 4 (2) 1
Netherlandsa 36,452 0.90 84.4 22.8 3.4 64.5 2.1 1.4 13.3 5.7 17 19 82.3 4 (2) 2
Norway 47,281 1.15 60.5 28.6 3.2 70.5 25.8 1.1 0.3 3.5 1.8 13 53.3 74.0 4 (4) 2
Sweden 32,183 1.24 126.9 21.6 8.3 64.7 25.0 2.1 1.4 0.7 0.6 26 68.8 91.0 3 (2) 1
Switzerland 36,954 1.12 234.7 10.9 4.1 65.6 33.7 1.4 0.0 8.6 2.1 13 18.2 48.0 3 (2) 2
MMEs










































































































Greecea 26,242 2.30 23.8 19.8 9.5 48.7 34.3 2.1 1.4 32.7 20.7 24 24 65 4 (4) 1
Italya 26,526 1.32 15.5 22.5 7.8 44.9 36.0 2.1 1.4 22.1 18.5 11 33.4 80 4 (3) 1
Portugala 21,395 1.35 35.9 21.5 9.5 56.0 2.1 1.4 12 6.5 97 20.5 65 3 (2) 1
Spaina 27,046 0.96 83.2 10.7 18.0 49.1 34.7 2.1 1.4 16.8 15.1 56 15 84.5 4 (3) 2
BRICs and others
Belgiuma 32,395 1.37 57.6 25.5 7.9 49.2 33.0 2.1 1.4 11.1 5.4 16 51.9 96 4 (4) 2
Brazil 9348 1.98 74.0 16.7 8.3 62.9 53.9 12.7 7.6 13.1 7.3 46 28.7 35 3 (2) 0
Chile 13,033 1.57 167.9 19.7 9.7 50.5 55.4 9 4.0 12.1 6.8 52 13.6 23.6 (1)
China 6206 3.30 81.0 10.3 4.3 57.6 41.5 14.6 4.2 17.8 4.5 91 22.3 5 (1)
India 2993 2.84 93.5 11.2 4.4b 36.8 27 7.9 53.4 56.5 56 41.1 60 2 (2)
Irelanda 35,801 0.86 16.5 23.1 11.7 54.3 34.3 2.1 1.4 10.4 0.4 18 35.2 44 5 (4) 2
Japan 29,372 1.14 74.6 9.2 5.0 56.8 2.8 1.6 10.7 7.5 4 18.2 16 3 (1) 0
Korea 25,525 1.48 107.4 16.3 3.6 58.6 10 8.7 18.4 14.7 91 10 10.3 3 (1)
Russia 13,623 3.03 67.9 15.8 8.2 42.3 8.8 5.9 14.4 3.6 17
South Africa 9340 2.38 278.4 27.8 23.8 40.5 57.8 4.9 4.4 9.4 6 24 27.7 42.5 3 (3) 2
Turkey 11,193 2.17 41.7 18.6 14.0 41.2 39.7 5.4 2.3 36.8 17.2 95 6.6 25 1
Sources: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/info/dialdata.htm (Key indicators of the labour market); http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
weo/2011/01/weodata; http://data.worldbank.org/;http://www.ilo.org/global/statistics-and-databases/lang-en/index.htm; http://www.oecd.org/document/
36/0,3746,en_2649_37443_35790244_1_1_1_37443,00.html (OECD Indicators of product market regulation); http://www.jussemper.org/Resources/
Labour%20Resources/Resources/Global_Wage_Report_2008-09.pdf; ICTWSS data base: http://www.uva-aias.net/208.
Notes: amember of the Eurozone; b2005 estimate; cRI ¼ routine involvement of unions and employers in government decisions on social and economic
policy (1 ¼ irregular, 2 ¼ often); W-coord: 1 ¼ fragmented, mostly firm; 2 ¼ mixed firm + industry weak enforceability; 3 ¼ industry; 4 ¼ industry with
central guideline and pattern bargaining; 5 ¼ national bargain or govt imposition; level ¼ level of collective bargaining (4 is central + industrial, 3 ¼
industrial, 2 ¼ industrial + firm,1 ¼ firm; trade union density ¼ % salary and wage workers that are unionised; coverage ¼ % workers covered by
















































CMEs (labour regulation) and is more like a MME with its attendant problems of
policy incoherence.
The South African case
South Africa clearly approximates neither an ideal type CME nor LME. Schneider
(2009) suggests that South Africa is more like a Latin American ‘hierarchical
market economy’ characterised by vertically integrated dominant firms, multina-
tional enterprises and weak trade unions. But while this may have been so under
apartheid, the post-apartheid political-economy is characterised by politically and
institutionally powerful trade unions and much lower levels of vertical integration.
In 1994, the gold-mining giant Anglo American controlled 43 per cent of the entire
Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) capitalisation – and the top five groups
controlled 84 per cent through complex cross-holdings and preferential shares.
This Apartheid-era concentration had been driven by exchange controls which
prevented firms from divesting abroad so, when exchange controls were liberal-
ised in the mid-1990s, it had a dramatic impact on economic concentration. By
1998 Anglo’s share had plummeted to 17 per cent as it ‘unbundled’ (selling off
part of the business to a BEE consortium), listed on the London Stock Exchange
and moved its head office to London.
One of the consequences of such unbundling and deregulation has been
increased investment volatility. As can be seen in Figure 1, portfolio investment
has come to play the dominant role in financing South Africa’s current account
deficit – and these flows are easily reversed. The only significant inflow of
foreign direct investment in the post-apartheid period was in 2001 when De
FIGURE 1. Increasingly volatile investment flows
Source: Data from the South African Reserve Bank (www.resbank.co.za).








































Beers mining company was sold to a foreign financial holding company causing
both a spike in foreign direct investment and an outflow of portfolio investment
capital. Increased reliance on volatile portfolio capital flows, privatisation of
state assets and the abolition of apartheid-era agricultural marketing boards has
fundamentally transformed the South African business environment in the direc-
tion of a LME. But economic collusion remains a problem (Competition Commis-
sion 2008) and South Africa’s labour-market regime looks more like a CME.
South Africa is an interesting case for scholars of VoC because there was sig-
nificant impetus from above (institutional formation at national level) and below
(regional accord processes) to create a more co-ordinated and social democratic
post-apartheid political-economy. As argued below, this CME-like vision was
subsequently undermined by government when it unilaterally adopted orthodox
macroeconomic policies and divided the business sector through BEE and other
preferential procurement policies. It was also undermined at the ideological
level by an alternative vision put forward by organised labour in favour of a devel-
opmental state and which down-played class compromise.
South Africa today contains elements of LMEs and CMEs. Macroeconomic,
trade and investment policy is economically liberal, but while it is relatively
easy to retrench workers for economic reasons, labour legislation is protective
in other respects, raising costs to employers (Barker 1999: 19; Bhorat and van
der Westhuizen 2009). South Africa’s welfare system is also more akin to the
CMEs: In 1994 the post-apartheid government inherited in system of social
grants which reached 2.9 million recipients (seven per cent of the population) at
a cost of 2.1 per cent of GDP; as of 2010, it now reaches 14 million people
(28 per cent of the population) at a cost of 3.3 per cent of GDP.1 But unlike the
ideal-type CME, no significant or sustained support is provided for the
unemployed.
Compared to the other middle-income and developing countries in Table 1,
South Africa has a relatively high coverage of collective bargaining and routine
involvement of trade unions and business in government policy. It also has by
far the highest unemployment rate. Between a quarter and a third (depending on
the measure) of the labour force is unemployed and less than half of working
age adults have jobs (Nattrass 2011). This is partly because the state has strong
regulatory capacity – particularly with regard to tax and labour legislation –
and there is thus no significant informal sector to provide jobs for those who
cannot find work in the formal sector. This is the crucial difference between
South Africa and other middle income countries – especially in Latin America
– where informal employment provides a safety net of sorts.
Unemployment is the central economic dilemma facing the country – and one
which poses different challenges for economic policy and wage-setting insti-
tutions than is evident in the Euro-centric CME/LME paths to growth. In the
European CMEs, labour-market protection is associated with lower inequality
because the wage distribution is compressed and because the unemployed get gen-
erous welfare assistance. In South Africa, however, where so many working age
adults are without work or government grants, inequality is driven primarily by
the gap between those with some work, and those with none (Seekings and Nat-









































impact in terms of poverty alleviation and narrowing inequality. However, for the
trade union movement, the priority is protecting and raising real wages, boosting
productivity and advocating for ‘decent work’ for the employed.
Figure 2 shows that employment growth was positive in the mid-2000s but that
it has been typically lower than that of real output, resulting in a trend increase in
aggregate labour productivity. Rising labour productivity is a positive sign in so
far as it indicates the economy is becoming more efficient. But the serious down-
side of rising labour-productivity for a labour-surplus economy like South Africa
is that ever fewer jobs are being created for each additional unit of output.
South Africa’s employment problem has strong historical roots. Mining and
agriculture were the major employers of unskilled labour under apartheid, but
their relative and absolute contribution to employment has fallen over the past
four decades. As the manufacturing and services sectors expanded, the apartheid
institutional infrastructure was revealed to be a major fetter on development.
Business responded to shortages of skilled labour and to the incentives provided
by government (for example, tax-breaks for capital-investment and negative
real interest rates) by becoming more capital-intensive. The tragedy of this
growth path is that just as the economy switched from labour shortage to labour
surplus in the 1970s, economic growth became steadily less labour-demanding.
High and rising unemployment was the inevitable result (Seekings and Nattrass
2005).
The democratic transition: the rise and fall of a CME vision in South
Africa
When South Africa made the transition to democracy, it did so under the long
shadow of apartheid. Racial discriminatory policies had left the economy with per-
sistent skills shortages and a business community divided on sectoral, cultural and
racial lines (Nattrass 1997b). Some labour-market reforms had been undertaken in
the 1970s, notably the ending of job reservation for whites only, and from 1979 the
FIGURE 2. Output, employment and aggregate labour productivity in South Africa
Source: Data from the South African Reserve Bank (www.resbank.co.za).








































system of collective bargaining was deracialised. This effectively legalised black
trade unions, allowing black workers to participate in industry-level bargaining –
and this system persists, fundamentally unchanged, today.
Representative employer organisations and trade unions set wages in bargain-
ing councils and these are typically extended to non-parties on request by the Min-
ister of Labour. Where no bargaining council exists, the government’s
Employment Conditions Commission sets minimum wages. This amounts to a
relatively strong level of wage co-ordination. As can be seen in Table 1, South
Africa is classified as a level 3 on a scale ranging from national agreement (5)
to firm-level agreements only (1).
As political opposition to, and protests against, apartheid mounted during the
1980s, key figures within South Africa’s business elite held secret meetings with
the African National Congress (ANC) in exile, and started engaging with opposi-
tion leaders inside the country (Handley 2008: 53–4; Van Wyk 2009: 9–10).
These consultations continued after 1990 when the ANC was allowed to operate
legally in the country and South Africa began the transition to democracy.
Nelson Mandela, who became South Africa’s first President, received regular
briefings from the business leaders and often dined with Anglo American patriarch
Harry Oppenheimer (Waldmeier 1997: 256–7).
When Mandela was released from prison in 1990, his first speech called for
nationalisation of the mines and monopoly industry. This was a long-standing
demand of the anti-apartheid movement – as embodied in the 1955 Freedom
Charter.2 However, ANC economic policy changed sharply during the early
1990s. In 1991, Mandela attended the Davos conference where he met with Li
Peng, the new premier of China, who said to him: ‘I don’t understand why you
are talking about nationalisation. You’re not even a communist party. I am the
leader of the communist party in China and I’m talking privatisation’. Mandela
subsequently repeated this conversation at every ANC discussion on the
economy and sought to assure investors that their investments would not be endan-
gered by nationalisation (Green 2008: 345–6). Davos proved to be a pivotal
moment, laden with different meanings and interpretation. According to Pallo
Jordan, an ANC cabinet minister from 1994 to 1999, ‘those who wield power in
the West told Nelson Mandela in no uncertain terms that any actions that threa-
tened property rights would invite their wrath’ and that ‘a chastened Mandela
returned to South Africa from Davos ready to drop the nationalisation of the
mines’ (Jordan 2012). Tito Mboweni, Mandela’s Minister of Labour and sub-
sequently Reserve Bank Governor, disagrees. Noting that he had been at Davos
with Mandela and had helped him rewrite the plenary address that has been
drafted ‘by well-meaning folks at the ANC office in Joberg’, Mboweni argues
that Mandela’s decision to drop nationalisation had been sparked by his discus-
sions with communist party leaders in China and Vietnam and that ‘It was not
Western capitalists. Not at all. I bore witness to that’ (Mboweni 2012).
As ANC policy documents became increasingly market-friendly and liberal
(Nattrass 1994), left critics started accusing it of forging an elite pact that
would leave existing power structures intact (see McKinley 1997; Bond 2000).
But as Cyril Ramaphosa, a leading ANC architect of the transition to democracy,









































were beginning to feel more and more comfortable with a mixed type of economy’
(quoted in Green 2008: 339). Even the South African Communist Party (a long
standing ally of the ANC) engaged in some soul-searching as its Secretary
General penned an influential piece titled ‘Has Socialism Failed?’ (Slovo 1990)
criticising Stalinism and asserting the importance of democratic freedoms. The
stage thus seemed set for the adoption of a more social democratic or co-ordinated
variety of capitalism in South Africa.
Further impetus was provided by spontaneous regional accord processes. In the
Eastern Cape Province, business organisations, labour and government came
together to form the Eastern-Cape Socio-Economic Consultative Council. This
helped foster more co-operative relations between business and the state (in one
initiative private sector advisors were seconded to local government to help
with public infrastructure revitalisation), but was less successful with regard to
capital-labour relations. Whereas business wanted organised labour to ‘put the
region first’, that is, to negotiate regionally-specific wages and not to participate
in national strikes, this was resisted by organised labour (Nattrass 1997a). In
other respects, however, organised labour started cutting productivity-related
pay deals with employers in order to save jobs (Nattrass 1995). In 1991, mining
employers and the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) entered into agree-
ments where workers accepted wage restraint and various forms of profit
sharing. The NUM acting general secretary noted: ‘The choice we had to make
was whether to drive a higher wage increase with less employment in the industry
as a real prospect – or whether we try to achieve maximum employment, and at
the same time augment wages and win social rights’.3 Although these innovative
wage-setting agreements fell apart three years later (because there were concerns
about the process of profit sharing and union officials were concerned about the
potentially divisive effect of having the more profitable mines pay workers rela-
tively higher wages4), they demonstrated that even South Africa’s militant trade
unions were capable of concluding agreements that recognised the trade-offs
between wages, employment and profitability. The possibility that South Africa
could move towards CME-type coordinated wage setting seemed very real
during the early 1990s and substantial energy was put into developing regional
and national-level social democratic institutions.
In 1990 organised business and labour agreed, in principle, to create a national
forum to discuss the impact of labour relations on the economy. This resulted in
the National Economic Forum being set up in 1992 – a body that was sub-
sequently transformed into the National Economic Development and Labour
Council (Nedlac) by one of the first pieces of legislation passed by the new demo-
cratic government in 1994. According to the leading business representative,
Nedlac was intended to ‘inaugurate a new era of inclusive consensus-seeking
and ultimately decision-making in the economic and social arenas’ (Parsons
2007: 9). Unfortunately, this hoped-for vision failed to materialise.
The first problem was that attempts to create the kind of peak-level business
organisation necessary for national co-ordination were plagued by racial divisions.
An organisation called Business South Africa (BSA) was formed to represent
South Africa at the International Organisation of Employers conference in
1994, and it subsequently went on to represent business in Nedlac. But this








































unity was fragile and tensions soon arose and the organisation fragmented between
the predominantly black and white business organisations. It took eight years
before a new umbrella body – Business Unity South Africa (BUSA) – was
created but, even then, racial divisions continued to simmer. These were exacer-
bated by the government’s BEE policies (discussed below) which further under-
mined the incentives for black and white business to work together. Eventually,
in 2011, the major black organisations left BUSA to form the Black Business
Council.
The second problem was that the government referred some, but not all, of its
economic policies to Nedlac. Thus, while the post-apartheid Labour Relations Act
was negotiated in Nedlac prior to reaching parliament, this was not the case with
the infamous 1996 ‘Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR)’ macroeco-
nomic framework which sought to restrain government spending (to deal with a
debt crisis), boost private investment and liberalise aspects of the labour laws to
promote job creation (DOF 1996). Although GEAR also called for a social
accord, this aspect was drowned out in the public debate by condemnation –
especially from organised labour – of its supposedly ‘neoliberal’ macroeconomic
and labour policy proposals (Nattrass 1996).
The discursive problem for the ANC was that when it fought its first election, it
had in its ‘Reconstruction and Development Program’ (RDP) promised to boost
employment creation through demand-driven growth and state-facilitated infra-
structural and housing programs (ANC 1994). This vision had been supported
by a group of ANC-aligned economists calling for expansionary fiscal and macro-
economic policies (MERG 1993). However, this option was rendered unworkable
by the sharp increase in the government deficit (from 1.5 per cent of GDP in 1990
to 7.3 per cent in 1993) that took place during the transitional period. By 1996,
when the ANC first obtained full control of government, controlling the debt
burden and stabilising the economy had become a priority – and even more so
in 1998 after the Asian currency crisis. The Ministry of Finance (now known as
the National Treasury) responded with GEAR – a document intended to boost
private investment by emphasising ‘fiscal discipline’ and to pave the way for
greater ‘regulated flexibility’ in the labour market (Nattrass 1996). Left trade
unionists, however, saw it as the beginning of the ‘1996 Class Project’ that is,
the ‘co-optation by White monopoly capital to weaken the National Democratic
Revolution and reverse the gains of the 1994 democratic breakthrough’.5
The public debate and protests over GEAR involved both communicative dis-
course (with the public) and coordinative discourse between the ANC and its alli-
ance partner – the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu). In both
cases, the National Treasury lost the rhetorical battle. Cosatu attacked government
for imposing these policies unilaterally, for reneging on its electoral promises, by
proposing changes to the labour legislation (by appearing to be supporting a ‘two-
tier’ labour-market) and selling out to business. The ANC responded by maintain-
ing its stance on fiscal discipline and continuing with trade liberalisation – but it
backed away from any changes to labour-market policy and effectively ceded the
Ministry of Labour to Cosatu.
While this served the ANC’s immediate political needs by offering an olive









































relationship between macroeconomic and labour-market policy-making at the
heart of the state. Whereas the National Treasury was and continues to be
staffed by mainstream economists, the Director General of Labour and the
Deputy Director General in charge of labour policy and industrial relations are
both long-standing trade unionists, and the current and previous Ministers of
Labour were ex chairperson of the Cosatu Women’s Forum and head of the tea-
cher’s union, respectively.
The result of this institutionalised ideological mismatch between two crucial
organs of economic policy-making has been an uncoordinated set of economic
and labour-market policies inimical to employment growth. Whilst labour-
market policies sought to raise and extend the coverage of minimum wages
whilst increasing non-wage costs of employment for business, tariffs on imported
manufactured goods were reduced sharply, from 23 per cent in 1994 to 8.6 per cent
in 2004 (Edwards 2005). As was the case in other countries attempting trade lib-
eralisation under rigid labour-market conditions and fiscal austerity (OECD 1999:
156–9), the results were costly in terms of employment, especially of unskilled
labour. Figure 3 shows that employment fell as real average remuneration rose
during the 1990s (and that this trend is evident in more recent years too). Note
that labour productivity rose faster on average than real wages, thereby enabling
the gross profit share and rate to rise. The winners were thus the employers who
remained in business, and those workers who kept their jobs. Some of these
workers, notably the most skilled, enjoyed substantial wage increases but, for
the most part, average real wages rose because relatively unskilled low-wage
jobs were shed (see also Seekings and Nattrass 2005).
Many factors contributed to the shedding of unskilled labour. These included
the impact of labour legislation, which raised the cost of employing labour, and
the operation of the wage-bargaining system, which set wage floors by industry
(binding predominantly on unskilled labour) – all of which provided strong incen-
tives for firms to substitute machinery for workers, and to have a smaller,
FIGURE 3. Trends in profitability
Source: Data from the South African Reserve Bank (www.resbank.co.za).








































better-skilled, better-paid and more manageable workforce (see Moll 1996;
Nattrass 2000). Even policies designed to improve the machinery of labour-
dispute resolution, notably the introduction of the Commission for Conciliation,
Mediation and Arbitration, had the unintended effect of burdening employers
further by operating in an unnecessarily legalistic way, thereby increasing the
risks to employers of hiring labour (Bhorat and Van der Westhuizen 2009).
This, in conjuncture with the trade liberalisation, put substantial pressure on
firms, especially those in the more labour-intensive tradeable sectors such as cloth-
ing (Anstey 2004: 1842).
Other policies, notably industrial policy with its focus on recapitalisation,
contributed further to rising capital intensity (Kaplan 2003, 2007). Although the
post-apartheid economic planners had hoped that recapitalisation would provide
a strong basis for growth, thereby expanding employment opportunities in the
future, industrial policy proved disappointing. As Kaplan (2007: 98–9) points
out, industrial policy was never consolidated under one arm of the state, but
remained scattered and even ‘hidden’ – such as support for arms production.
Industrial policy was also bedevilled by having to address too many strategic con-
cerns, including regional development, small-business development, racial trans-
formation in hiring, skills development, moving up the value chain, promoting
labour-demanding growth and BEE. The result was that industrial policy as a
whole became less well targeted and effective. Attempts to create structured
forms of engagement with business (including national investment summits and
regional forums as part of the spatial development initiative) failed to build the
necessary trust and information flows required for effective industrial policy.
The key institutional casualty was Nedlac. According to a representative from
the Presidency (during Mbeki’s term of office), Nedlac failed because Cosatu was
fearful that business was bypassing Nedlac and influencing the state directly – as
it was believed to have done with regard to GEAR. Others argue that government
was primary to blame and that its failure to discuss GEAR in Nedlac was sympto-
matic of a broader desire to maintain control over policy.6 But according to Jayen-
dra Naidoo, Nedlac’s first executive director, the key issue was that organised
labour was never comfortable with the tripartite aspect of Nedlac, preferring
instead to have bilateral engagement with business over wages/working con-
ditions and with the ANC over policy.7 This, in turn, was facilitated by a an
alternative policy discourse emanating from the trade union movement in
favour of a strong developmental state designed to assist and discipline capital
whilst promoting productivity growth and ‘decent’ work.
The contrasting growth vision from organised labour
During the early 1990s, intellectuals aligned with the trade union movement
grappled with how to engage with capitalism. Constrained by the collapse of
socialism in Europe to accept market-oriented policies, they nevertheless saw
themselves as radical socialists engaging with both state and business on a stra-
tegic level to establish a basis for socialism in the future (Gall 1997). Arguments
by visiting social democrats and Australian trade unionists for class compromise









































(Nattrass 1999). According to Harcourt and Wood, this reflected deep historical
antagonisms: ‘Years of intense conflict, precipitated, at least in part, by a
system of “Racial Fordism” at the workplace, have radicalized workers, so that
calls for wage moderation and cooperation with management would probably
be perceived as signs of co-optation’ (2003: 95–6). Thus even those unionists
who accepted the need for class compromise may have felt themselves discur-
sively trapped by this history.
Instead, the trade union position eventually coalesced into support for a capital-
ist system shaped and managed by a ‘developmental’ state – which would support
a high-wage, high-productivity growth path through complementary labour-
market and industrial policies (see Vavi 2008a, 2008b). This ‘high productivity
now’ strategy assumes that even in a labour surplus country like South Africa it
is necessary to increase labour productivity today in order to project the
economy onto a more ‘dynamic’ growth path tomorrow (Nattrass 2001). It
adopts aspects of the East Asian development experience – notably a role for
active industrial policy (Wade 1990) – whilst disregarding the central character-
istic of the East Asian growth experience: that surplus labour was drawn initially
into low-wage labour-intensive sectors, and that the economies were only pro-
jected onto a more capital- and skill-intensive labour demand growth path once
that surplus labour had been absorbed and average skill levels improved (Birdsall
and Jasperson 1997). Instead, it asserts the need for ‘living wages’ and ‘decent
work’, thereby employing a rhetorical strategy inimical to low-wage, low-
productivity employment strategies. Precisely because it prioritises ‘decent’
high-wage jobs for the employed, it is, ironically, a reincarnation of the old
trickle-down story: increases in productivity supposedly drive the rising tide of
economic growth; the unemployed must get trained and wait for the employment
waters to rise.
This approach has strong echoes of Porter (1990) in that it assumes national
competitive advantage rests primarily (if not solely) on the adoption of ‘best prac-
tice technology’ and on active state involvement in support of innovation and
otherwise generally encouraging structural change in favour of higher value-
added activities. In the hands of trade union intellectuals, this approach was
adapted to include the use of wage pressure to ‘force’ South African capitalism
onto the cutting edge and up the value chain (Nattrass 2001).
An early influential statement of this vision was articulated by the Industrial
Strategy Project (Joffe et al. 1995), a trade union-linked think-tank which
favoured using wage growth and employment protection to ‘encourage restructur-
ing up the value chain rather than restructuring towards low-wage, low-pro-
ductivity forms of production’ (Joffe et al. 1995: 213). They situated the South
African labour movement’s approach to industrial restructuring within this par-
ticular logic, pointing out that it was ‘premised on the need to move South
African firms out of their low-wage, low-skill, low-productivity vicious circle
in which they are out-competed by the second-tier newly industrialising countries
(Joffe et al. 1995: 214). In other words, not only does it take as a given that South
Africa’s wage structure is too high to compete with the newly industrialising
countries and that the appropriate response is for the state to assist firms to
become more productive (which typically implies more capital-intensive








































production) in order to compete on a higher wage, high productivity trajectory, but
it also assumes that destroying existing (competitive) low-wage production is part
of the strategy. This resonates with popular notions that if low-wage production is
allowed to exist, there will be a ‘race to the bottom’. Such ideas serve to denigrate
low-wage labour-intensive jobs and deflect attention away from the fact high and
low productivity operations can co-exist where they compete in different product
markets.
In 2009, in the cabinet reshuffle following Thabo Mbeki’s replacement as pre-
sident by Jacob Zuma, Ebrahim Patel was appointed to the newly created ministry
of Economic Development tasked with co-ordinating and planning the govern-
ment’s economic policies. Patel, who had been General Secretary of the South
African Clothing and Textile Workers Union from 1999–2009 and national
labour convenor for Nedlac, is deeply committed to using government resources
and policies to promote high-wage, high value-added forms of production. The
first policy document produced by the Ministry of Economic Development, the
‘New Growth Path’ plan is centred on this vision (Nattrass 2011) – as is industrial
policy with its Porter-like emphasis on ‘world class manufacturing’, upgrading
and the like (see DTI 2011).
Cosatu’s vision thus appears to be at the centre of the government’s growth
strategy, but there are signs that it is not necessarily a hegemonic position. For
example, the Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan (2011) recently suggested
that changes to South Africa’s labour dispensation may be necessary to prevent
further job losses in the clothing sector – a view subsequently endorsed by
Trevor Manuel, a previous minister of Finance.8 There appears to be major differ-
ences of opinion within government about economic policy, but under Jacob
Zuma’s political leadership there have never been any effective attempts to
resolve them. Certainly since Rob Davies (a member of the SACP) became min-
ister of Trade and Industry, there has been better co-ordination between trade and
labour policy in the sense that there have been no further unilateral decreases in
tariffs, and government assistance to industry has been conditional on firms com-
plying with labour legislation. But tensions remain between DTI and Labour on
the one hand, and the Ministry of Finance and the Reserve Bank on the other
(both of which are regarded by the left as pursuing unnecessarily restrictive
fiscal and monetary policies).
Race, business and the state
The potential for economic co-ordination has been undermined further by racia-
lised and increasingly clientalistic relations between business and the state. The
cordial relationship between the ANC and the white business elite that had been
evident during the transition to democracy unravelled in early 1997 when the
head of Standard Bank offered to assist government with its ‘capacity’ problems
by suggesting that senior executives be seconded to government as ‘part of their
commitment to transformation’ (Gevisser 2007: 686–7). Thabo Mbeki, then
Deputy President and increasingly responsible for economic affairs, was appar-
ently offended by the suggestion that the new government needed assistance









































‘Business Trust’ in 1998 to raise money for job creation and education, that he re-
opened lines of communication by creating a working group through which he
would meet with big business leaders (Handley 2008: 90–1).
The situation for black business, however, was very different. The ANC gov-
ernment, especially after Mbeki became president in 1999, championed BEE to
encourage rapid redistribution of share ownership from white to black hands.
This had a significant impact. Just as the old white corporate sector had maintained
power and control over vast swathes of the apartheid economy through inter-
locking directorships and shareholdings, a now tightly connected new black
elite serves on each other’s boards and is closely connected to the national govern-
ment (Calland 2006: 265; Van Wyk 2009; Seekings and Nattrass 2011). This is
justified by an unabashed ideology that frames the promotion of a black business
elite as both just and good for South Africa (Seekings and Nattrass 2011). SACP
critics, however, regard this as a justification for cronyism and as a betrayal of the
revolution (SACP 2006; Turok 2008). Ironically, though, beneficiaries of BEE
include the politically connected black elite and trade unions who, by virtue of
their largely black membership, are able to invest pension funds and debt in
BEE deals. Notable amongst these has been the Mineworkers Investment
Company (owned by the NUM), Kapanao ke Matla (owned by Cosatu), Sactwu
Investment Group (owned by Sactwu) and the Union Alliance Holdings (owned
jointly by Cosatu and other trade union groupings).
The first major BEE legislation was the 2000 Preferential Procurement Frame-
work Act, which required that government favours tenders from black-owned
companies. Further BEE legislation was promulgated in 2003 to promote
sector-specific ‘charters’ specifying targets in terms of BEE deals (Hirsch 2005;
Gqubule 2006; Turok 2008: 155–7). This was backed up by legislation, for
example the Minerals and Petroleum Development Resources Act of 2004
which required mining houses to become BEE compliant if they wanted to
renew their mining licences. The basic model for a BEE deal is that black investors
buy a discounted stake in a company (sometimes through holding companies or
Trusts) financed through a combination of bank loans (sometimes underwritten
by the company involved), expected dividend flows and increases in share
price.9 In return, the company is able to gain informal access to the black political
elite, lucrative government contracts, mining licences and the like.
In February 2007, the government gazetted new ‘Codes of Good Practice’ for
so-called ‘broad-based’ BEE in an attempt to spread the benefits more widely.10 It
widened the range of business practices, such as affirmative action, employee
share ownership for which firms could earn BEE ‘points’.11 As the BEE status
of supplier firms affects the BEE status of contracting firms, BEE compliance is
now being strongly transmitted through value-chains. In the process, the business
environment has become fundamentally re-racialised, although this time to the
advantage of (especially politically-connected) black rather than white people.
Increasingly, the interconnections between the ruling elite and BEE benefici-
aries has raised the spectre of corruption and nepotism – with the attendant
worry that South Africa may be moving towards a more patrimonial variety of
capitalism. In the mid-1990s, the Treasurer of the ANC, Thomas Nkobi, favoured
the creation of party-aligned business structure. Although this was never endorsed








































as official policy, Jacob Zuma’s advisor, Shabir Shaik, went on to create Nkobi
Holdings (of which the ANC had a 10 per cent stake), a conduit later shown to
have received payments from companies in return for lucrative contracts mostly
in the arms industry, but also government contracts such as the supply of South
African driver’s licences (KPMG 2012: 27). Other similar shady investment
vehicles were created and South African newspapers regularly carry stories and
exposés of corruption, where tender processes are abused and contracts awarded
to individuals close to the state. As Robinson and Brummer concluded in 2006,
‘the murky relationship between money and politics has been at the heart of
almost every major scandal faced by political parties and the government since
1994’ (2006: 2). Most infamously, there has been a steady drip of revelations in
the media about the corrupt arms deal, in which inter alia millions of Rands
were channelled through Nkobi Holdings to Jacob Zuma. Schabir Shaik was
found guilty in 2005 on two counts of fraud and corruption for his profiteering
in the arms deal through Nkobi Holdings. Jacob Zuma (now president) was
depicted by the judge as having a ‘generally corrupt’ relationship with Shaik. Sub-
sequent attempts to prosecute Zuma failed as the prosecuting authority folded in
the face of political pressure and influence.
The arms deal is one of the most contentious issues of post-apartheid South
Africa. It has resulted in civil society mobilisation in favour of full disclosure,
in resignations from parliament by disgusted ANC members of parliament and
various public interest lawsuits. Part of the justification for the arms deal was
that the firms awarded the armaments contracts would deliver ‘offset’ investments
– that is, would promise to invest in other parts of the economy, thereby creating
jobs. Alec Erwin, the erstwhile Minister for Trade and Industry, was one of the
most fervent supporters of the arms deal, supposedly because the offset deals
could boost South Africa’s industrial policy (Feinstein 2007: 232; Green 2008:
474–5). However, less than a quarter of the paltry 12,000 offset-related jobs
were actually delivered (Feinstein 2007: 232).
The growing number of examples of graft, corruption and the abuse of state
power in the allocation of contracts has harmed South Africa’s reputation in the
business and international communities. So too has the erosion of trust in South
Africa’s police services. Jackie Selebi, the national police commissioner from
2000 until 2008, was convicted of corruption and sentenced to 15 years in jail
(though he was released on supposedly medical grounds after serving less than
a year) and South Africa’s criminal investigation and prosecutions authorities
have been plagued for more than a decade by political intrigue. Figure 4 plots
the Heritage Foundation’s changing index of perceived corruption and other
aspects of ‘business freedom’.12 Perceived freedom from corruption improved
in the late 1990s, but has been on a sharp trend decline since 1998. Thus while
fiscal and trade ‘freedom’ (basically a measure of trade liberalisation and orthodox
fiscal policy – both of which shape the macro environment) trend upwards, the
micro business environment (corruption, controls on investment, BEE, labour
laws barriers to entrepreneurship) have trended the other way. The World Bank
governance indicators are even more negative about post-apartheid South









































quality and especially control of corruption have been trending sharply down-
wards in the 2000s.
The rational strategy for white business, in this environment, is to act defen-
sively and for individual capitalists to look after their own narrow interests,
perhaps through continued unbundling and disinvestment, and otherwise by enga-
ging in BEE deals and the like in order to obtain government patronage through
the back door. The rational strategy for black business is to accumulate capital
FIGURE 4. Business freedom indices (Heritage Foundation)
Source: http://www.heritage.org/index/explore.aspx?view=by-region-country-year.
FIGURE 5. Governance indicators (World Bank)
Source: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.








































on a parasitic basis (by obtaining shares in return for political favours and connec-
tions) rather than participating in the productive sector of the economy where con-
flict with labour is inevitable. Those that do venture into the productive sector are
likely to lobby the government for additional support, such as tariff protection and
even bail-outs.
In short, there are strong indications that a form of crony capitalism is develop-
ing with a peculiarly South African twist in which organised labour lobbies gov-
ernment on behalf of employed workers and its investment interests. However,
unlike in Zambia and Ghana where this is a serious problem (Handley 2008),
the South African economy is large enough for there to be many other routes
for aspirant capitalists to make money – even though BEE regulations may act
as a tax on that effort. Furthermore, there exists a dynamic civil society which
has resisted the government, notably on AIDS, poor education delivery, and
corruption in the arms deal. Neo-patrimonialism thus may grow, but as long as
civil society remains strong, and the economy reasonably diverse, it is unlikely
to become the key defining feature of post-apartheid capitalism.
The rational strategy for organised labour is to continue lobbying the govern-
ment for pro-labour policies and to involve itself in BEE deals. What this
means for the prospects of a more co-ordinated variety of capitalism emerging
in South Africa is an open question. Iheduru (2002) points out that organised
labour’s involvement in business deals (so-called ‘comrade capitalism’ or
‘business unionism’) blurs the lines between workers and owners thereby giving
workers a ‘material stake’ in the economy, and helping build a black business
class. He argues that this will make cross-class compromises more likely and be
good for ‘social concertation’. But as long as unions continue to reject wage
restraint and insist that it is the job of government to mobilise development-
state type policies to boost productivity and move firms up the value chain,
then class compromise is unlikely. Indeed, one would expect unions to demand
industrial policy support when companies run into trouble. For example, in
2011–12, R66.7 million was provided by the Department of Trade and Industry
to Seardell, a clothing and textile producer part-owned by Sactwu, for modernis-
ation, upgrading and the financing of additional capacity. Ironically, though, this
large injection failed to stem the tide of job losses as Sactwu continued to push for
higher wages.
Conclusion
Post-apartheid South Africa thus appears to have CME-like labour regulations
entrenched alongside growing neo-patrimonialism. But it also, somewhat para-
doxically, operates in a more liberal economic environment – at least on some
dimensions. For example, Figure 4 shows that South Africa’s ‘fiscal’ and
‘trade’ freedom increased between the 1990s and 2000s – largely because of
trade liberalisation and the countries fairly orthodox fiscal and monetary policies.
The problem for businesses – especially those in the internationally competitive
labour-intensive product markets – is that the combination of high and rising
labour costs and trade liberalisation places a serious squeeze on profitability









































benefit firms operating in higher wage, higher productivity niches, but it comes at
the cost of growing capital-intensity and persistently high unemployment. Racial
inequality has declined sharply in the post-apartheid era, but unemployment
coupled with no support for the unemployed has resulted in the persistence of
both poverty and inequality, albeit in new, class-based forms (Seekings and Nat-
trass 2005). It is a variety of capitalism which provides CME-like support for the
employed, patrimonial and increasingly corrupt support for sections of black
business, whilst effectively excluding the predominantly unskilled, unemployed
from the fruits of growth.
South Africa’s failure to create sufficient jobs to address the unemployment
crisis is posing serious challenges for economic policy and social policy.
Recent attempts to boost youth employment through a wage subsidy scheme
met with strong resistance from organised labour which has remained implacably
opposed to the idea that jobs should be created through lowering the cost of
employment. Despite growing concern about job losses (notably in clothing) bar-
gaining councils continue to use the legal system and local sheriffs to shut down
firms which fail to pay the negotiated minimum wage. Calls by the Minister of
Finance and the head of South Africa’s Planning Commission for a more employ-
ment-friendly labour relations system reflect a growing disquiet in government
circles about the role of institutions in exacerbating unemployment.
One option is to move more in the direction of a CME and introduce social
welfare for the unemployed – which will lower inequality but increase the
tax burden. But this is resisted by business and organised labour because
South Africa’s relatively narrow tax base means that all income earners will
have to pay higher taxes. Another option is to move more in the direction of
a LME with regard to labour laws whilst retaining statist components (for
example, industrial policy) where they are effective. This, however, is strongly
resisted by organised labour. The framing of those who propose labour-market
reforms as ‘neo-liberal’ and as ‘sell-outs’ makes it very difficult to have a pro-
ductive discourse about how best to build an inclusive political-economy in
South Africa.
Finally, South Africa’s adversarial labour relations pose major challenges for
any co-ordinated solutions involving class compromise. Most worryingly,
violent strikes disrupted the mining industry in 2012 – most notoriously in
August when over 47 miners were killed by the police. The once powerful
NUM, which had brokered profit-sharing deals in the gold mining industry in
the early 1990s, appears to have lost ground to a rival union, with a particularly
adversarial approach to wage setting. This has all but stalled investment in South
African mining. The Western Cape wine industry has also suffered from spon-
taneous and organised protests and demands that the minimum wage in agricul-
ture be doubled. In neither the mining nor the agricultural wage disputes have
any efforts been made to link wage demands to profit sharing arrangements or
job retention. Although there are some employee share ownership schemes in
mining and agriculture, these are rare. Overall, there appears to be no immediate
prospect for a more co-ordinated, social-democratic variety of capitalism in South
Africa.









































1. The increase is attributable to the introduction of a child support grant and extensions in eligibility criteria for
the old age pension. See South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin, September 2011: 52–3.
2. See http://scnc.ukzn.ac.za/doc/HIST/freedomchart/freedomch.html
3. Interviewed in The South African Labour Bulletin, vol.16, no.2, (1991): 19.
4. Personal communication with NUM officials in 1994.
5. http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=2534
6. Interviews with business representatives and the spokesman for, and executive director of, Nedlac (May–
October 2008).
7. Discussion 16 October 2008.
8. For a report on this, see: http://mg.co.za/article/2011-08-25-cabinet-no-pravin-we-wont-relax-sas-labour-
laws
9. Interview with a broker of BEE deals, February 2009.
10. Government Gazette 29,617, 9 February 2007.
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